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Abstract
We consider a linear quantity setting duopoly game and analyze which of the
players will commit when both players have the possibility to do so. To that end,
we study a 2-stage game in which each player can either commit to a quantity in
stage 1 or wait till stage 2. We show that committing is more risky for the high
cost ﬁrm and that, consequently, risk dominance considerations, as in Harsanyi
and Selten (1988), allow the conclusion that only the low cost ﬁrm will choose
to commit. Hence, the low cost ﬁrm will emerge as the endogenous Stackelberg





j em subindex j, superindex zero
1 one
l ’el’
I R+ symbol for positive real numbers
w small double u
W capital double u
µ greek mu
ν greek nu
Γ capital greek gamma
ln symbol for natural logarithm
α greek alpha
Φ capital greek phi
∂ symbol for partial derivative
Ψ capital greek psi4
1 Introduction
Ever since Von Stackelberg wrote his Marktform und Gleichgewicht in 1934, it has been
well-known that in many duopoly situations a ﬁrm is better oﬀ when it acts as a leader
than when it acts as a follower. Since each ﬁrm will strive to obtain the most favorable
position for itself, the question arises which of the two duopolists will gain victory and
obtain this leadership position. Von Stackelberg concluded that in general it is not pos-
sible to answer this question theoretically (Von Stackelberg, 1934, pp. 18-20). In this
paper, we consider the special case of a linear quantity setting duopoly game and show
that in this case the role assignment may follow from risk considerations. Speciﬁcally,
we demonstrate that committing is less risky for a low cost ﬁrm so that such a ﬁrm will
emerge as the Stackelberg leader.
Our work is inspired by an idea of Thomas Schelling. Of course, Schelling is most well-
known for his general demonstration of the value of commitment, i.e. that committing is
beneﬁcial for a player who is the only one able to make a commitment. Schelling realized
that, as a consequence, all players in the game will attempt to commit themselves and
that a coordination problem might arise: committing is beneﬁcial only if the opponent
does not commit, it might be (very) costly if the opponent also commits himself. This
in turn implies that a player might decide not to commit himself since he fears that the
opponent might commit as well and since the costs associated with the resulting “Stack-
elberg war” might be too high (Schelling, 1960, p. 39). Hence, there is a fundamental
trade-oﬀ between ﬂexibility and commitment. Schelling pointed out this trade-oﬀ, but
he did not provide a formal analysis of it, he did not solve the game. Our aim in this
paper is to provide a full solution for the linear 2-person duopoly game.
We consider a quantity setting duopoly game with linear demand and constant
marginal cost. One ﬁrm is more eﬃcient, i.e. has lower marginal cost, than the other.
The formal model used to analyze the trade-oﬀ between commitment and ﬂexibility is
the 2-stage action commitment game from Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). The rules are5
as follows. Each duopolist has to move (i.e. to choose a quantity) in one of two periods;
choices are simultaneous, but, if one player chooses to move early while the other moves
late, the latter is informed about the ﬁrst-mover’s choice before making his decision.
Hence, moving early is proﬁtable if one is the only player to do so, but it is costly if the
other commits as well. This timing game has several equilibria, in particular, each of the
Stackelberg outcomes of the underlying duopoly game is an equilibrium. As Hamilton
and Slutsky pointed out, these are the only pure undominated equilibria of the game.
We select the solution of the game by using the risk-dominance concept from Harsanyi
and Selten (1988). This concept allows one to quantify the risks involved with the two
candidate solutions and, hence, it enables to resolve the trade-oﬀs. Risk considerations
show that committing is less risky for the ﬁrm that has the lower marginal cost. This
safer equilibrium in which the low cost ﬁrm moves ﬁrst is the neutral focal point and,
adopting the risk dominance concept, the players will coordinate on it.
Some intuition for this result might be obtained by looking at the 2 × 2 game in
which each player is restricted to use one of two strategies: either to commit himself to
his Stackelberg leader quantity or to wait till the second period and then best respond
to the quantity chosen by the opponent, with players choosing their Cournot quantities
in the second period if neither player moved in the ﬁrst period. (See Table 1 in Section
3 for the payoﬀ matrix.) Both Stackelberg outcomes appear as strict equilibria in this
game and it is well-known that risk dominance allows a simple characterization for such
2 × 2 games: the equilibrium with the highest (Nash) product of the deviation losses is
the risk dominant one. (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988, Lemma 5.4.4). In Section 3 we show
that the equilibrium where the low cost ﬁrm commits is risk dominant in this reduced
game. The intuition is that, if player 1 has higher marginal costs, then his reaction curve
is below the reaction curve of player 2, so that his Stackelberg and Nash quantities are
closer together, which implies that he can gain less from committing himself than player
2 can. On the other hand, player 1 incurs greater losses than player 2 does if both players
commit themselves. As a consequence, player 1 is in a weaker bargaining position to
push for his most favored outcome and he will lose the battle.6
If the risk-dominance relation between our two candidate solutions could always be
decided on the basis of the 2 × 2 game spanned by them, then our problem could be
solved by straightforward computation. Unfortunately, the problem posed in this paper
is not that simple to solve and the above mentioned characterization of risk dominance
is of limited use for the problem addressed. In our “action commitment” game, a player
has inﬁnitely many strategies available; the choice is not simply between committing to
the Stackelberg leader quantity and waiting. Furthermore, it is known that, in general,
the reduced 2 × 2 game spanned by the two equilibrium candidates may capture the
overall risk situation rather badly. Consequently, to ﬁnd the solution of the game, there
is no recourse but to apply risk dominance to the overall game. Now risk dominance
is deﬁned by means of the tracing procedure and the fact that this procedure is rather
complex and diﬃcult to handle forces us to restrict ourselves to the linear case. Even in
this most simple linear case, the computations are already rather involved, they become
very cumbersome in the more general case. Nevertheless, the main result of this paper
is that risk dominance indeed selects the equilibrium in which the low cost ﬁrm leads.
The present paper is part of a small, but growing, literature that aims at endogenizing
the ﬁrst mover in oligopoly models. Ours is the ﬁrst paper in which a speciﬁc Stackelberg
outcome is derived from a model in which the duopolists are in symmetric positions ex
ante and in which only endogenous (strategic) uncertainty is present. Related papers
either put ﬁrms in asymmetric positions to start with, or add exogenous uncertainty
(about production costs or market demand), or admit multiple equilibrium outcomes.
Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) consider the same game as we do and they show that the
two Stackelberg equilibria are the only pure strategy equilibria in undominated strategies.
Hence, they conclude that a Stackelberg outcome will result but they cannot tell which
one. Sadanand and Sadanand (1996) analyze the same model when ﬁrms face demand
uncertainty, which is resolved before production in the second stage. (Also see Sadanand
and Green (1991).) There is always a symmetric (Cournot) equilibrium: both ﬁrms move7
late when uncertainty is large and early when there is no uncertainty. In addition, both
Stackelberg outcomes can be sustained as equilibria provided that uncertainty is not
too large. Hence, to select a unique Stackelberg outcome it is necessary to assume that
uncertainty inﬂuences the duopolists in an asymmetric way. An interesting asymmetric
variant that Sadanand and Sadanand analyze is a large ﬁrm versus fringe model. Since
each fringe ﬁrm individually is too small to inﬂuence output, the unique equilibrium now
has the large ﬁrm committing itself, while the small ﬁrms remain ﬂexible. Spencer and
Brander (1992) study a similar duopoly model with demand uncertainty. However, they
assume that a ﬁrm who moves early is informed about the time at which the opponent
moves, which simpliﬁes the analysis considerably. For example, when both ﬁrms decide
to move early, it follows that they will produce Cournot quantities. In a symmetric set-
ting, both ﬁrms will move early (resp. late) when uncertainty is low (resp. high), so that
in each case a Cournot outcome results. A Stackelberg outcome may result when ﬁrms
are in asymmetric positions: when one ﬁrm is much better informed about the exoge-
nous shock than the other, then the better informed ﬁrm may emerge as the Stackelberg
leader. A diﬀerent type of asymmetry is considered in Kambhu (1984): one ﬁrm is risk
neutral and the other is risk averse. In this case, the risk neutral ﬁrm may arise as the
Stackelberg leader. Mailath (1993) puts the ﬁrms in asymmetric starting positions. One
ﬁrm is informed about demand, while the other faces uncertainty and only the informed
ﬁrm has the option to move ﬁrst. In the unique “intuitive” equilibrium the informed
ﬁrm indeed acts as a Stackelberg leader, even if it could earn higher ex ante proﬁts by
choosing quantities simultaneously with the uninformed ﬁrm.
Saloner (1987) considers a model related to the one discussed here in which also
two periods of production are allowed. Firms simultaneously choose quantities in the
ﬁrst period; these become common knowledge and then ﬁrms simultaneously decide how
much more to produce in the second period before the market clears. Saloner shows that
any outcome on the outer envelope of the two reaction functions lying inbetween the
two Stackelberg outcomes can be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium. Ellingsen
(1995) notes that only the two Stackelberg outcomes survive iterated elimination of8
(weakly) dominated strategies in this game. Pal (1991) generalizes Saloner’s analysis by
allowing for cost diﬀerences across periods. If production is cheaper in the ﬁrst period
(resp. much cheaper in the second period), then both ﬁrms produce their Cournot quan-
tities in the ﬁrst (resp. second) period. In the intermediate case, where costs fall slightly
over time, either of the two Stackelberg outcomes can be sustained as a subgame perfect
equilibrium. Hence, none of these papers can make a selection among the Stackelberg
outcomes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The underlying duopoly game as
well as the action commitment game from Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) are described in
Section 2, where also relevant notation is introduced. Section 3 describes the speciﬁcs
of the tracing procedure as it applies in this context and deﬁnes the concept of risk
dominance. The main results are derived in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. Some proofs
are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model
The underlying linear quantity-setting duopoly game is as follows. There are two ﬁrms, 1
and 2. Firm i produces quantity qi at a constant marginal cost ci ≥ 0. The market price
is linear, p = max{0,a−q1−q2}. Firms choose quantities simultaneously and the proﬁt of
ﬁrm i is given by ui(q1,q2) = (p−ci)qi. We assume that 3ci−2cj ≤ a (i,j ∈ {1,2},i 6∈ j),
which implies that a Stackelberg follower will not be driven out of the market. We will
restrict ourselves to the case where ﬁrm 2 is more eﬃcient than ﬁrm 1, c1 > c2. We write
ai = a − ci.
The best reply of player j against the quantity qi of player i is unique and is given by
bj(qi) = max{0,(aj − qi)/2}. (2.1)
The unique maximizer of the function qi 7→ ui(qi,bj(qi)) is denoted by qL
i (ﬁrms i’s
Stackelberg leader quantity). We also write qF
j for the quantity that j will choose as a9
Stackelberg follower, qF
j = bj(qL
i ), and Li = ui(qL
i ,qF
j ) and Fi = ui(qF
i ,qL
j ). We write
(qN
1 ,qN
2 ) for the unique Nash equilibrium of the game and denote player i’s payoﬀ in this


































i , (i = 1,2) (2.4)
Li > Ni > Fi, (i = 1,2) (2.5)
hence, each player has an incentive to commit himself.
To investigate which player will dare to commit himself when both players have the
opportunity to do so, we make use of the two-period action commitment game that was
proposed in Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). The rules are as follows. There are two
periods and each player has to choose a quantity in exactly one of these periods. Within
a period, choices are simultaneous, but, if a player does not choose to move in period 1,
then in period 2 this player is informed about which action his opponent chose in period
1. This game has proper subgames at t = 2 and our assumptions imply that all of these
have unique equilibria. We will analyze the reduced game, g2, that results when these
subgames are replaced by their equilibrium values. Formally, the strategy set of player
i in g2 is I R+ ∪ {Wi}, where Wi denotes i’s strategy to wait till period 2, and the payoﬀ
function is given by
ui(qi,qj) = (ai − qi − qj)qi (2.6)10
ui(qi,Wj) = (ai − qi − bj(qi))qi (2.7)
ui(Wi,qj) = (ai − qj)
2/4 (2.8)
ui(Wi,Wj) = (2ai − aj)
2/9 (2.9)
It is easily seen that g2 has three Nash equilibria in pure strategies: Either each player
i commits to his Nash quantity qN
i in the ﬁrst period, or one player i commits to his
Stackelberg leader quantity qL
i and the other player waits till the second period. One
also notices (with Hamilton and Slutsky (1990)) that the ﬁrst (Cournot) equilibrium is
in weakly dominated strategies (committing to qN
i is dominated by Wi in g2), hence, one
expects that only the (Stackelberg) equilibria in which players move in diﬀerent periods
are viable. Below we will indeed show that the Cournot equilibrium is risk dominated by
both Stackelberg equilibria (Proposition 1). It should be noted that besides these pure
equilibria, the game g2 admits several mixed equilibria as well. These mixed equilibria
will not be considered in this paper, the reason being that we want to stick as closely
as possible to the general solution procedure outlined in Harsanyi and Selten (1988), a
procedure that gives precedence to pure equilibria whenever possible.
Although mixed strategy equilibria will not be considered, we stress that mixed strate-
gies will play an important role in what follows. The reason is that, in the case at hand,
a player will typically be uncertain about whether the opponent will commit or not, and
such uncertaintly about the opponent’s behavior can be expressed by a mixed strategy.
Let mj be a mixed strategy of player j in the game g2. Because of the linear-quadratic
speciﬁcation of the game, there are only three “characteristics” of mj that are relevant
to player i, viz. wj the probability that player j waits, µj the average quantity to which
j commits himself given that he commits himself, and νj, the variance of this quantity.
Speciﬁcally, it easily follows from (2.6)-(2.9) that the expected payoﬀ of player i against
a mixed strategy mj with characteristics (wj,µj,νj) is given by
ui(qi,mj) = (1 − wj)(ai − qi − µj)qi + wj(2ai − aj − qi)qi/2 (2.10)
ui(Wi,mj) = (1 − wj)((ai − µj)
2/4 + νj/4) + wj(2ai − aj)
2/9 (2.11)11
Note that uncertainty concerning the quantity to which j will commit himself makes it
more attractive for player i to wait: νj contributes positively to (2.11) and it does not
play a role in (2.10). On the other hand, increasing wj or decreasing µj increases the
incentive for player i to commit himself.
3 Risk Dominance and the Tracing Procedure
The concept of risk dominance captures the intuitive idea that, when players do not
know which of two equilibria should be played, they will measure the risk involved in
playing each of these equilibria and they will coordinate expectations on the less risky
one, i.e. on the risk dominant equilibrium of the pair. The formal deﬁnition of risk
dominance involves the bicentric prior and the tracing procedure. The bicentric prior
describes the players’ initial assessment about the situation. The tracing procedure is
a process that, starting from some given prior beliefs of the players, gradually adjusts
the players’ plans and expectations until they are in equilibrium. It models the thought
process of players who, by deductive personal reﬂection, try to ﬁgure out what to play
in the situation where the initial uncertainty is represented by the given prior. Below we
describe the mechanisms of the tracing procedure as well as how, according to Harsanyi
and Selten (1988), the initial prior should be constructed.
First, however, we recall that risk dominance allows a very simple characterization
for 2 × 2 games with two Nash equilibria: the risk dominant equilibrium is that one
for which the product of the deviation losses is largest. Consequently, if risk dominance
could always be decided on the basis of the reduced game spanned by the two equilibria
under consideration (and if the resulting relation would be transitive), then the solution
could be found by straightforward computations. Unfortunately, this happy state of
aﬀairs does not prevail in general. The two concepts do not always generate the same
solution and it is well-known that the Nash product of the deviation losses may be a bad
description of the underlying risk situation in general. (See, Carlsson and van Damme12
(1993) for a simple example.) In our companion paper (van Damme and Hurkens, 1998)
we show that also in duopoly games the two concepts may yield diﬀerent solutions. In
the present case, however, the two concepts do generate the same solutions. Since the
calculations based on the reduced game are easily performed we do these ﬁrst.
Consider, ﬁrst of all, the reduced game spanned by the Cournot equilibrium (qN
1 ,qN
2 )
and by the Stackelberg equilibrium (qL
1 ,W2) in which ﬁrm 1 leads. In this 2 × 2 game,
W2 weakly dominates qN
2 , hence, the product of the deviation losses associated with the
Cournot equilibrium is zero and, in the reduced game, the Stackelberg equilibrium is
risk dominant. Exactly the same argument establishes that the Cournot equilibrium is
risk dominated by the Stackelberg equilibrium in which ﬁrm 2 leads. Next, consider
the reduced game where each player is restricted to either committing himself to his






Fig. 1: Reduced version of the quantity commitment game.
where Li,Ni and Fi are as in (2.3) and where Di denotes player i’s payoﬀ in the case of
Stackelberg warfare
Di = (ai − aj)(2ai − aj)/4. (3.1)
At the equilibrium where i leads the product of the deviation losses is equal to




Consequently, the product of the deviation losses at (W1,qL
2 ) is larger than the similar
product at (qL
1 ,W2) if and only if13
a1(2a2 − a1) > a2(2a1 − a2),
which holds since a1 < a2. Hence, the product of the deviation losses is largest at the
equilibrium where the eﬃcient ﬁrm 2 leads: risk considerations based on reduced game
analysis unambiguously point into the direction of the Stackelberg equilibrium where
the low cost ﬁrm leads. As already argued, there is, however, no guarantee that this
shortcut indeed identiﬁes the risk dominant equilibrium of the overall game. The only
way to ﬁnd out is by fully solving the entire game. This we do in the next section. In
the remainder of this section, we formally deﬁne the concepts involved.
Let g = (S1,S2,u1,u2) be a 2-person game and let mi be a mixed strategy of player
i in g (i = 1,2). The strategy mi represents the initial uncertainty of player j about i’s




2 ) in which the payoﬀ
functions are given by
u
t,m
i (si,sj) = (1 − t)ui(si,mj) + tui(si,sj). (3.2)
Hence, for t = 1, this game gt,m coincides with the original game g, while for t = 0 we
have a trivial game in which each player’s payoﬀ depends only on his own action and his
own prior beliefs. Write Γm for the graph of the equilibrium correspondence, i.e.
Γ
m = {(t,s) : t ∈ [0,1],s is an equilibrium of g
t,m}. (3.3)
It can be shown that, if g is a generic ﬁnite game, then, for almost any prior m, this
graph Γm contains a unique distinguished curve that connects the unique equilibrium
s0,m of g0,m with an equilibrium s1,m of g1,m. (See Schanuel et al. (1991) for details.)14
The equilibrium s1,m is called the linear trace of m. If players’ initial beliefs are given
by m and if players’ reasoning process corresponds to that as modelled by the tracing
procedure, then players’ expectations will converge on the equilibrium s1,m of g.
In this paper we will apply the tracing procedure to the inﬁnite game g2 that was
described in the previous section. To our knowledge, ours is the ﬁrst application of these
ideas to a game with a continuum of strategies. For such games, no generalizations of
the Schanuel et al. (1991) results have been established yet, but as we will see in the
following sections, there indeed exists a unique distinguished curve in the special case
analyzed here. Hence, the non-ﬁniteness of the game g2 will create no special problems.
It remains to specify the players’ initial beliefs when they are uncertain about which
of two equilibria of g, s or s0, should be played. Harsanyi and Selten (1988) argue as
follows. Player j, being Bayesian, will assign a subjective probability zj to i playing si
and he will assign the complementary probability z0
j = 1−zj to i playing s0
i. With these
beliefs, player j will play a best response against the strategy zjsi+z0
js0
i that he expects i
to play. Assume that j chooses all best responses with equal probability and denote the
resulting strategy of j with bj(zj). Player i does not know the beliefs zj of player j and
applying the principle of insuﬃcient reason he considers zj to be uniformly distributed
on [0,1]. Writing Zj for a uniformly distributed random variable on [0,1], player i will,
therefore, believe that he is facing the mixed strategy
mj = bj(Zj) (3.4)
and this mixed strategy mj of player j is player i’s prior belief about j’s behavior in
the situation at hand. Similarly, mi = bi(Zi), where Z1 and Z2 are independent, is the
prior belief of player j, and the mixed strategy pair m = (m1,m2) is called the bicentric
prior associated with the pair (s,s0). Given this bicentric prior m, we say that s risk
dominates s0 if s1,m = s, where s1,m is the linear trace of m. In case the outcome of the
tracing procedure is an equilibrium diﬀerent from s or s0, then neither of the equilibria15
risk dominates the other. Such a situation will, however, not occur in our 2-stage action
commitment game, provided that the costs of the ﬁrms are diﬀerent.
4 Commitment and Risk Dominance
In this section, we prove our main results. Let g2 be the endogenous commitment game
from Section 2. Write Si for the pure equilibrium in which player i commits to his
Stackelberg leader quantity in period 1, Si = (qL
i ,Wj), and write C for the equilibrium
in which each player commits to his Cournot quantity in period 1, C = (qN
1 ,qN
2 ). We
show that both Stackelberg equilibria risk dominate the Cournot equilibrium and that
S2 risk dominates S1 when c2 < c1. The ﬁrst result is quite intuitive: Committing to qN
i
is a weakly dominated strategy and playing a weakly dominated strategy is risky. The
proof of this result is correspondingly easy.
Proposition 1 . In g2, the Stackelberg equilibrium Si risk dominates the Cournot equi-
librium C (i = 1,2).
Proof. Without loss of generality, we just prove that S1 risk dominates C. We ﬁrst
compute the bicentric prior that is relevant for this risk comparison, starting with the
prior beliefs of player 1.
Let player 2 believe that 1 plays z2S11 +(1−z2)C1 = z2qL
1 +(1−z2)qN
1 . Obviously, if
z2 ∈ (0,1), then the best response of player 2 is to wait. Hence, the prior belief of player
1 is that player 2 will wait with probability 1, m2 = W2.
Next, let player 1 believe that 2 plays z1S12+(1−z1)C2 = z1W2+(1−z1)qN
2 . Obviously,
waiting yields player 1 the Nash payoﬀ N1 as in (2.3), irrespective of the value of z1.
When z1 > 0 then committing to a quantity that is (slightly) above qN
1 yields a strictly
higher payoﬀ, hence, the best response is to commit to a certain quantity q1(z1). The
reader easily veriﬁes that q1(z1) increases with z1 and that q1(1) = qL
1 . Consequently, if
m1 is the prior belief of player 2 then for the characteristics (w1,µ1,ν1) of m1 we have:
w1 = 0, µ1 > qN
1 , ν1 > 0.16
Now, let us turn to the tracing procedure. The starting point corresponds to the best
replies against the prior. Obviously, the unique best response against m2 is for player 1
to commit to qL
1 , while player 2’s unique best response against m1 is to wait. Hence, the
unique equilibrium at t = 0 is S1. Since S1 is an equilibrium of the original game, it is
an equilibrium for any t ∈ [0,1]. Consequently, the distinguished curve in the graph Γm
is the curve {(t,S1) : t ∈ [0,1]} and S1 risk dominates C. 2
We now turn to the risk comparison of the two Stackelberg equilibria. Again we start
by computing the bicentric prior based on S1 and S2. Let player j believe that i commits
to qL




i + (1 − z)Wi) = z(3aj − 2ai − 2qj/2) + (1 − z)(2aj − ai − qj)qj/2(4.1)
uj(Wj,zq
L
i + (1 − z)Wi) = z(3aj − 2ai)
2/16 + (1 − z)(2aj − ai)
2/9 (4.2)
Given z, the optimal commitment quantity qj(z) of player j is given by
qj(z) = (aj − ai)/2 + aj/2(1 + z), (4.3)
which results in the optimal commitment payoﬀ equal to
[2aj − ai + z(aj − ai)]
2/8(1 + z). (4.4)
Note that q2(z) > q1(z) for all z ∈ [0,1]. The reader easily veriﬁes that committing yields
a higher payoﬀ than waiting if and only if z is suﬃciently small. Speciﬁcally, committing




j − (4aj − 2ai)2 (4.5)17
Note that 0 < z1 < z2, so that both players initially commit with positive probability, it
being more likely that player 2 commits. Hence, denoting the best response of player j
against zqL





Wj if z > zj.
qj(z) if z < zj.
(4.6)
Consequently, writing mj for the prior of player i (mj being given by (3.4)) and writing
(wj,µj,νj) for the characteristics of this prior we have
wj = 1 − zj, (4.7a)
µj = (aj − ai)/2 + aj ln(1 + zj)/2zj, (4.7b)
νj = a
2






Straightforward computations now show that
w1 > w2, (4.8a)
µ1 < µ2, and (4.8b)
ν1 < ν2. (4.8c)
These inequalities already give some intuition for why committing is more risky for player
1: he attaches a smaller probability to the opponent waiting, he expects the opponent to
commit to a larger quantity on average, and he is more uncertain about the quantity to
which the opponent commits himself. All three aspects contribute positively to making
waiting a more attractive strategy.18
In the next Lemma we show that actually waiting is a dominant strategy for ﬁrm 1






for the relative cost advantage of player i (αj > 1 if and only if ci < cj). Note that zj
depends on ai,aj only through αj
zj =
(4 − 2αj)2
18 − (4 − 2αj)2 (4.10)
and that zj is a decreasing function of αj.
Lemma 1 Write m0
2 for the prior strategy of player 2 as given by (4.7). If α2 is suﬃ-
ciently small, then u1(q1,m0
2) < u1(W1,m0





j) = zj(ai − qi − µj)qi + (1 − zj)(2ai − aj − qi)qi/2
= [ai − aj/2 + zj(aj/2 − µj)]qi − (1 + zj)q
2
i/2. (4.11)




ai − aj/2 + zj(aj/2 − µj)
1 + zj
(4.12)
We know that any quantity qj ≤ qN
i is weakly dominated by Wi for player i in g2, hence,19
such a quantity yields strictly less than Wi against any nondegenerate mixed strategy
of player j. Consequently, the result follows if q∗
1 ≤ qN




2ai − aj + zj(2aj − ai) ≤ 3aj ln(1 + zj)
or
2αj − 1 + zj(2 − αj) ≤ 3ln(1 + zj) (4.13)
A straightforward computation shows that this inequality is satisﬁed when zj = 1
2. (In
that case αj = 2−
q
3
2.) In the relevant parameter range (zj ≤ 1,αj ≥ 2
3), the derivative
of the LHS of (4.13) (with respect to αj) is larger than the derivative of the RHS of
(4.13), hence, the result follows. 2
In the next Lemma we show that, in contrast to the previous result, the most eﬃcient
ﬁrm’s best response to the prior is always to commit.
Lemma 2 Write m0
1 for the prior strategy of player 1 as given by (4.7). Then
u2(m0
1,W2) < maxq2 u2(m0
1,q2).







[ai − aj/2 + zj(aj/2 − µj)]2
2(1 + zj)
On the other hand, waiting yields
ui(Wi,m
0
j) = zj[(ai − µj)
2/4 + νj/4] + (1 − zj)(2ai − aj)
2/920
















(2 − 8α + 8α
2 + z(−7 + 10α − α








and where α1 and z1 are as in (4.9) and (4.10). Note that z1 is a function of α1, so that
Φ (as appearing in (4.14)) can be viewed as a function of α1 only. A direct computation
shows that Φ(1) > 0, hence, player 2 prefers to commit when the costs are equal. In the
appendix we show that
Φα ≥ 0,Φz ≤ 0, and zα ≤ 0 (4.15)
from which it follows that committing becomes more attractive for player 2 when his
cost advantage increases. Consequently, ﬁrm 2 ﬁnds it optimal to commit against the
prior for all parameter constellations. 2
The Lemmas 1 and 2 imply that the Stackelberg equilibrium with ﬁrm 2 as leader is
the (unique) equilibrium at the start of the tracing procedure when z2 ≥ 1
2. It, hence, is
an equilibrium of gt for any value of t and, therefore
Corollary 1 If the diﬀerence in costs is suﬃciently large (speciﬁcally, if z2 ≥ 1
2), then
the Stackelberg equilibrium in which the eﬃcient ﬁrm leads risk dominates the other
Stackelberg equilibrium.21
In the remainder of this section, we will conﬁne attention to the case where the cost
diﬀerence is small enough so that also for the ineﬃcient ﬁrm 1 the best response to the
prior involves a commitment. So from now on z2 < 1
2.2 The next Lemma shows that it
cannot be true that both ﬁrms keep on committing themselves to the end of the tracing
procedure: at least one of the ﬁrms has to switch. The Lemma thereafter will then show
that it is the weakest ﬁrm that switches ﬁrst, which implies that the outcome will always
be leadership of the strong ﬁrm.
Lemma 3 Let st be the equilibrium on the path of the tracing procedure at “time” t if the
players priors are as in (4.7). Then there exists i ∈ {1,2} and t < 1 such that st
i = Wi.
Proof. Assume not, so that each player ﬁnds it optimal to commit at each point reached
by the tracing path. Writing qt
i for the optimal commitment quantity of player i at time
t, it is easily seen that q1
i = qN
i for i = 1,2, since the payoﬀ functions at t = 1 coincide
with those of the original game. Furthermore, qt
i > qN
i for t < 1 since any quantity less
than aN
i is strictly dominated by waiting. Write ut
i for the payoﬀ function at “time” t












be the gain that player i realizes by committing himself. Clearly, gi(1) = 0. Furthermore,
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Furthermore, the partial derivative with respect to qj is equal to
−q
N
i + (ai − q
N
j )/2 = 0
so that g0
i(1) > 0 and gi(t) < 0 for some t < 1. But this contradicts our assumption that
it is optimal to commit for each player for any value of t < 1. 2
Our strategy for proving that it is the weakest ﬁrm that switches ﬁrst is to show that
this ﬁrm will switch ﬁrst even when the more eﬃcient ﬁrm is more ‘pessimistic’. Speciﬁ-
cally, we will show that even when the eﬃcient ﬁrm believes that the other commits with
the same probability as it itself does, the ineﬃcient ﬁrm will switch before. Speciﬁcally,
write mj for the prior strategy of player j as given by (4.6) and write ¯ mj for the strategy
deﬁned similarly, but with z1 replaced by z2. Let m = (m1,m2) and ¯ m = (¯ m1, ¯ m2).
Hence, player 2 is more pessimistic in ¯ m, while player 1’s prior beliefs are the same in
m and ¯ m. (Recall from (4.5) that z1 < z2.) Assume that each player ﬁnds it optimal to
commit at t = 0 when the prior is m. Write q
t,m
i (qj) for the best commitment quantity
of player i at t when the opponent commits to qj at that time and denote the (unique)













j) > 0 (1 = 1,2) for t suﬃciently small and (qt
1,qt
2) is the equilibrium on the
tracing path for such t. Deﬁne (¯ qt
1, ¯ qt
2) and ¯ gt
i similarly, but with m replaced by ¯ m in the
above deﬁnitions. We now have
Lemma 4 Let ti = sup{τ ∈ [0,1] : gt
i(qt
i,qt
j) ≥ 0 for all t ∈ [0,τ]}. Then t2 > t1.
Proof. We only provide a sketch of the proof here and relegate technical details to the23
Appendix. The proof consists of comparing the tracing path (qt
1,qt
2) with the tracing
path (¯ qt
1, ¯ qt
2). We ﬁrst show that ¯ qt
2 < qt
2 and ¯ qt
1 ≥ qt
1. These inequalities are intuitive:
player 2 is more pessimistic if the prior is ¯ m, hence, he will commit to a lower quantity.
This in turn gives player 2 an incentive to commit to a higher quantity when the prior
is ¯ m. Furthermore, if player 2 is more pessimistic, then he ﬁnds committing himself less
attractive: ¯ gt
2 ≤ gt
2. Still, since ﬁrm 2 has lower cost than ﬁrm 1 has, committing is more
attractive for ﬁrm 2 than for ﬁrm 1 when both ﬁrms are equally pessimistic: ¯ gt
1 < ¯ gt
2.
The result follows by combining the above observations. Formally then, in the Appendix































































(The ﬁrst equality holds since player i’s prior is the same in both cases; the ﬁrst and
fourth inequality follow from the monotonicity of the quantities; the second and sixth
inequality follow from the best response properties, and the ﬁfth inequality follows since
player 2 is more pessimistic when the prior is ¯ m.) 2





with player 1 being actually indiﬀerent between waiting and committing to q
t1
1 . The
tracing path must now continue along an interval I (with t1 ∈ I) with equilibria of the
form (m1(t),qI
2(t)), where player 2 commits to qI
2(t) and player 1 uses a mixed strategy:
he waits with probability w(t) and commits to qI
1(t) with the complementary probability
1−w(t). The two commitment quantities are determined by the optimality condition for
player 1 (qI
1(t) must be the optimal commitment quantity) and the indiﬀerence condition
for player 1 (committing optimally yields the same payoﬀ as waiting). The probability
of waiting, w(t), is determined by the optimality condition for player 2.24
Fig. 2: The tracing path initially follows qC, then bends backwards along qI and ﬁnally
ends along qW at S2.
Fig. 2 illustrates the argumentation: Time t is on the horizontal axis, ﬁrm 2’s com-
mitment quantity on the vertical axis. The Figure contains three curves. Curve qC plots
the commitment strategy of ﬁrm 2 when ﬁrm 1 commits for sure and play is in equilib-
rium. As we established in Lemma 4, both ﬁrms keep committing from t = 0 to t = t1,
therefore the tracing path follows this curve upto t = t1. Curve qI plots ﬁrm 2’s com-
mitment quantity that leaves ﬁrm 1 exactly indiﬀerent between committing and waiting.
The tracing path has to continue along this curve from t = t1. (In the Appendix we
establish that the curve necessarily bends backwards.) Curve qW describes the optimal
commitment quantity when ﬁrm 1 waits with probability 1. The tracing path follows
this curve from t = t0 to t = 1. It follows that the endpoint of the tracing path is the
equilibrium where player 2 leads, hence, we have shown
Proposition 2 The Stackelberg equilibrium in which the low cost ﬁrm leads risk domi-25
nates the Stackelberg equilibrium in which the eﬃcient ﬁrm follows.
By combining the Propositions 1 and 2 we, therefore, obtain our main result:
Theorem 1 The Stackelberg equilibrium in which the eﬃcient ﬁrm leads and the inef-
ﬁcient ﬁrm follows is the risk dominant equilibrium of the endogenous quantity commit-
ment game.
Furthermore, as a Corollary we immediately have that the shortcut via the reduced
games, as taken in Section 3, indeed correctly identiﬁed the risk dominant equilibrium of
the overall game. Finally, the Stackelberg equilibrium that is selected is the one with the
highest produced quantity (hence, the lowest price) and the highest total proﬁts. So, in
this case, the selected equilibrium is the one where both the producer and the consumer
surplus are highest.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have endogenized the timing of the moves in the linear quantity-setting
duopoly game by means of Harsanyi and Selten’s concept of risk-dominance. To our
knowledge, this is the ﬁrst application of the (linear) tracing procedure to games where
the strategy spaces are not ﬁnite.3 We have seen that no new conceptual problems are
encountered, but that the computational complexities are quite demanding. Ex post
we could verify that these computations were not necessary: The shortcut by means
of a comparison of the Nash products of the deviation losses yields the same answer.
However, as already said, there is no guarantee for this to happen in general and in
our companion paper van Damme and Hurkens (1998) we show that the two concepts
yield diﬀerent solutions in a price setting context. In that paper we analyze endogenous
price leadership in a linear market for diﬀerentiated products. Again, we assume that26
ﬁrms diﬀer in their marginal costs and we show that the eﬃcient ﬁrm is the leader in
the risk dominant equilibrium. In this case, however, that equilibrium has a smaller
Nash product than the Stackelberg equilibrium in which the ineﬃcient ﬁrm leads. Quite
interestingly, if the cost diﬀerential is suﬃciently small, the ineﬃcient ﬁrm has higher
proﬁts than the eﬃcient ﬁrm in the risk dominant equilibrium: It proﬁts from free riding
as a follower.
Although Von Stackelberg (1934) argued that in general it is not possible to determine
theoretically which of the duopolists will become the leader (“Es is jedoch theoretisch
nicht zu entscheiden, welcher der beiden Dyopolisten obsiegen wird”, p. 20), he also
provides a numerical example for which he does determine the actual leader. The example
is given by
p = 10 − Q/100, c1 = 2, c2 = 1.5, F1 = 500, F2 = 600, (5.1)
where Fi is the (unavoidable) ﬁxed costs of ﬁrm i. Von Stackelberg argues that in this
case ﬁrm 2 (which is the one with the lower marginal cost) will most likely become the
market leader since it makes less losses than ﬁrm 1 in the case of Stackelberg warfare:
We have qL
1 = 375,qL
2 = 450,D1 = −593.75,D2 = −487.50. Hence, ﬁrm 2 makes less
losses during the price war and, therefore, it can win the war of attrition. Of course,
this argument is entirely diﬀerent from the one developed in this paper. Von Stackelberg
also remarks that actually this outcome is quite natural and follows from the model’s
assumption that the second ﬁrm is a more modern one which has higher ﬁxed costs,
but lower marginal cost.4 This last comment is very intriguing since, if the modern ﬁrm
would have substantially higher ﬁxed costs, exactly the same argument would imply that
the old-fashioned ﬁrm would become the leader.
Note that we did not provide the solution of the endogenous timing game for the
case where both ﬁrms have the same marginal cost. The reader might conjecture that in
that case the Cournot equilibrium would be selected, however, Lemma 3 shows that that27
conjecture is wrong. If the outcome of the tracing procedure at t = 1 would be (qN
1 ,qN
2 ),
then each player would strictly prefer to wait at t < 1, but clearly (W1,W2) cannot be
an equilibrium at such t. It follows that, in the symmetric case, the outcome must be
a mixed strategy equilibrium. (It obviously must be a symmetric equilibrium as well.)
Since mixed equilibria have received almost no attention in the oligopoly literature, we
refrain from providing the explicit solution of the symmetric game. Let us note, however,
that also in the case where the costs diﬀer, the endogenous timing game has a variety of
mixed strategy equilibria. We did not take these into consideration since the Harsanyi
and Selten (1988) equilibrium selection theory allows us to neglect them. That theory
gives precedence to pure equilibria whenever these exist and we did consider all pure
equilibria in this paper.
In this paper we only allowed for one point in time where the players can commit
themselves, however, one can easily deﬁne the game gt in which there are (t−1)-periods
in which the players can commit themselves. (g1 = g, g2 is as in (2.6) – (2.9) and gt is
deﬁned by induction for t ≥ 3.) Knowing the solution of g2, the game gt, with t ≥ 3,
can be solved by backward induction, i.e. by applying the subgame consistency principle
from Harsanyi and Selten (1988): No matter what the history has been, a subgame
gτ has to be played according to its solution. Adopting this principle, one sees that
in g3 waiting is a dominant strategy of player 2: If he waits he can best respond if the
opponent commits, while he is guaranteed his Stackelberg leader payoﬀ if the other waits
as well. Consequently, player 2 will wait and committing becomes a riskless strategy for
player 1. Hence, the solution of g3 is that player 1 will commit itself. In other words,
player 1 commits in order to prevent that player 2 will commit himself. We come to the
conclusion that the predicted outcome is very sensitive to the number of commitment
periods: If t is even, the solution of gt is (W1,qL
2 ) while, if t ≥ 3 is odd, the solution of gt
is (qL
1 ,W2). In our opinion, this lack of robustness reﬂects the fact that the discrete time
model with t ≥ 3 is not an appropriate one to model commitment possibilities. In future
work we plan to investigate the issue in continuous time, while possibly also allowing for
commitments to be built up gradually. For earlier work along this direction, we refer to28
Spence (1979) and to Fudenberg and Tirole (1983).29
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Appendix
In this Appendix we complete the proofs of the Lemmas 2 and 4 and Proposition 2.
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
We have to show that the inequalities (4.16) hold. Hence, we have to show that
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It is straightforward to verify that zα ≤ 0. It is easily seen that Φα ≥ 0 if and only if
−8 + 16α + z(10 − 2α) − 18ln(z + 1) ≥ 0.
Now, ln(1 + z) ≤ z, z ≤ 1/2, and α ≥ 1, from which it follows that the above inequality
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where the last inequality follows from z ≤ 1/2.
This completes the proof of the inequalities (4.16) and, therefore, of Lemma 2. 2
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
We will prove the inequalities from (4.19) in the following order: First (1) and (4), next
(5) and ﬁnally (3). Note that the inequalities (2) and (6) hold by deﬁnition: ¯ qt
1 (resp.
qt
2) is the optimal commitment quantity against ¯ qt
2 (resp. qt
1) in the game ¯ gt (resp. gt).
Furthermore, the equality in (4.16) holds since player 1 has the same prior in g as in ¯ g.
PROOF OF THE INEQUALITIES (1) AND (4) FROM (4.19)
Write mx











j = mj and m
zi
j = ¯ mj. Write gt,x for the game at t when the prior is given by





(1 − t)[ai − aj/2 + x(aj/2 − µx
j)] + t[ai − qj]
(1 − t)(1 + x) + 2t
,
where µx






ai + (1 − t)[xai − aj − aj ln(1 + x)]/2 − tqj






< 0 if x ≤ 1/2, q1 ≤ q
L
1 and t < 1
.33
A straightforward computation shows that the derivative is negative if and only if






(1 + t + x(1 − t)) < 2a2 + (1 − t)(xa2 − a1 − a1 ln(1 + x)) − 2tq1,
and, as both sides of this inequality are linear in t, it suﬃces to check that the inequality
holds at both endpoints. Now, at t = 0 the inequality simpliﬁes to
a1 ln(1 + x) < a2
which holds since a1 ≤ a2. At t = 1, the inequality simpliﬁes to
q1 < a1(1 + x)
and this holds because of our restrictions on the parameters. (Recall that these restric-
tions are without loss of generality: player 1 will not commit to a quantity that is larger
than the Stackelberg leader quantity and if z2 ≥ 1/2 then Lemma 1 applies.)
Since z1 < z2 (cf. (4.8)), Claim 1 implies that player 2’s best response quantity is lower
in gt, ¯ m than it is in gt,m. Since player 1 has the same best response correspondence in
these two games, it follows that player 2 (resp. player 1) commits to a lower (resp. higher)





is increasing and cuts the 45◦-degree line at a point lower than the one where the ﬁrst
graph cuts the diagonal.) Hence, Claim 1 establishes that for t < 1:
q
t




2 > ¯ q
t
2.
The proof of the inequalities (1) and (4) can now be completed by showing that the gain
from committing is decreasing in the opponent’s quantity. Because of the linearity of







ui(Wi,qj) = −(ai − qj)/2.
In the relevant range where both players ﬁnd it optimal to commit themselves (t ≤
min(t1,t2)) we have qi ≥ qN
i for i = 1,2, and, therefore
−qi + (ai − qj)/2 ≤ 0,
which completes the inequalities (1) and (4).






















The second integrand is clearly nonnegative. The ﬁrst is nonnegative since q2 ≥ qN
2 .
This establishes inequality (5).
PROOF OF INEQUALITY (3)
The proof involves some straightforward, but tedious calculations. For simplicity, write
x = z2. Because of Lemma 1 and Corollary 1 we may conﬁne ourselves to the case where
x < 1/2. The reader may verify, that up to a positive multiplier, ¯ gt
2(¯ qt
1, ¯ qt




equal to Ψ(t,x), where35
Ψ(t,x) = (x + 1)(x − 2)(−2x − 1) + t(x − 1)
2(4x + 1)
+t





2 − 1 + t(−1 + 2x − 2x
2) + t
2(x − 1)
2 ln(1 + x)
+3(t − 1)(2 + 2x + t(3 − 2x))ln
2(1 + x)
For x ≤ 1/2, Ψ(t,x) is concave in t so that the minimum is attained in t = 0 or t = 1.
Now direct substitution yields
Ψ(0,x) = (x + 1)(x − 2)(−2x − 1) + 6(x
2 − 1)ln(1 + x) − 6(1 + x)ln
2(1 + x)
Using the fact that ln(1 + x) ≤ x, we obtain
Ψ(0,x) ≥ (x + 1)(x − 2)(−2x − 1) − 6(1 − x
2)x − 6(1 + x)x
2
= (x + 1)(2 − 3x − 2x
2) > 0
Another direct substitution gives
(1 + x)Ψ(1,x) = 9x − 6(1 + x)ln(1 + x)
≥ 3x(1 − 2x) > 0,
where we again have used that ln(1 + x) ≤ x. Consequently Ψ(t,x) > 0 for all t and x,
which completes the proof of inequality (3). 2
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2




(1 − t)(ai − aj/2 + zj(aj/2 − µj)) + t(ai − qj)
1 + t + (1 − t)zj
(A.1)36
Let qC
1 (t) and qC
2 (t) be optimal commitment quantities against each other. Using (??)
(applied to qC





j (t)) + qC
i (t)(1 + t + (1 − t)zi) + t(ai − qj)
1 + t + (1 − t)zj
(A.2)
For t ∈ (0,1), let qI
2(t) denote the commitment quantity of ﬁrm 2 that leaves ﬁrm 1
indiﬀerent between committing optimally (to qI
1(t)) and waiting. We know from previous
analysis that ﬁrm 1 strictly prefers committing to waiting when ﬁrm 2 commits to qC
2 (t),
for all t < t1. Moreover, the gain from committing is decreasing in the opponent’s
commitment strategy. Hence, the curve qI
2(t) intersects the curve qC
2 (t) from above at
t = t1. (See Fig. 2.)
The tracing path must continue along the curve qI
2(t) for some time. We need to
establish the direction. On the tracing path it must hold that qI
2(t) is the best reply
against ﬁrm 1’s strategy of waiting with probability w(t) ≥ 0 and committing with the
remaining probability to qI
1(t). It is easily established that the optimal commitment





1(t)). Using (??) this is equivalent to
(1 + t + (1 − t)z1)q
I
2(t) ≥ −t(a2 − q
C
1 (t)) + q
C
2 (t)(1 + t + (1 − t)z2) + t(a2 − q
I
1(t)).
Multiplying both sides by 1 + t + (1 − t)z2 and using (??) once more, this is equivalent
to





1 (t)t(1 − t)(z2 − z1) + q
C












This implies that the tracing path must bend backwards. 237
Footnotes
1. This game has also been studied by Dowrick (1986), who concludes “that there is
no obvious solution to this game where ﬁrms can choose their roles” (p. 259).
2. This bound is not sharp. It can be shown that committing is optimal for ﬁrm 1 if
α1 > 1.081 (or z2 < 7
20).
3. Harsanyi and Selten (1988) and G¨ uth and van Damme (1991) considered discretized
versions of games with inﬁnite strategy sets.
4. Von Stackelberg denotes the ﬁrst ﬁrm by A and the second by B and he writes
“In unserem Beispiel wird warscheinlich die Unternehmung A der Underlegene
sein, weil sie den gr¨ oßeren Verlust erleidet. Dies entspricht auch der Konstruktion
unseres Beispiels, in welchem f¨ ur B ein modernerer Betrieb (h¨ ohere ﬁxe Kosten,








Fig. 1: Reduced version of the quantity commitment game.39
Fig. 2: The tracing path initially follows qC, then bends backwards along qI and ﬁnally
ends along qW at S2.